





Innovating in networks with partners that have diverse knowledge is challenging. The challenges stem from the
fact that the commonly used knowledge protection mechanisms often are neither available nor suitable in early
stage exploratory collaborations. This article focuses on how company participants in heterogeneous industry
networks share private knowledge while protecting firm-specific appropriation. We go beyond the prevailing
strategic choice perspectives to discuss interactive revealing practices that sustain joint opportunity creation in the
fragile phase of early network formation. (Keywords: Innovation Management, Intellectual Property, Technology
Management, Learning)
Heterogeneous networks provide opportunities for participating firmsto combine diverse knowledge, escapemyopia and competency traps,and expand beyond any one organization’s competitive horizons.1Serendipitous innovation opportunities can lead to strategic renewal.2
Joint opportunities are created endogenously in heterogeneous networks.3
After a firm makes the strategic choice of participating, its researchers and engi-
neers interact with other researchers and engineers to realize the latent opportu-
nities.4 This interaction is fragile, however, during a period in which opportunities
must first be identified and created before any commitment to their exploitation
can be made.
A tension between opportunity co-creation and private appropriation
ensues.5 Shared norms, social capital, and common history are largely absent
early on; and legitimized, shared authorities that would penalize for emergent
opportunism are still missing.6 Opportunity creation, and the related interaction
around problems and solutions, is both tacit and murky, interfering with the com-
monly prescribed governance mechanisms, such as contracts, task partitioning,
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modularization, and transparency.7 Fears of oppor-
tunistic behaviors result in parties’ fleeing the scene
or taking a defensive posture.8 Innovation opportu-
nities fail to materialize, and networks fail.9
Tensions of opportunity co-creation and pri-
vate appropriation are commonplace in heteroge-
neous innovation networks that aim to produce
concepts, demonstrations, and pilots collaboratively
by integrating knowledge across industries. Such
cross-industry innovations might involve health
and wellness technologies, clean energy, or the
Internet of Things. Although the diversity of knowl-
edge provides the possibility of new opportunity creation that goes beyond the
potential of any one firm alone, such heterogeneity demands that the participants
have patience as they interact and learn from each other. In addition, the network
must find its “sweet spot” in terms of the degree of heterogeneity: too little, and
the commercialization space becomes crowded as firms in adjacent industries seek
to profit; too much, and common ground from which firms can relate to the
knowledge of others is absent or hard to find.10
Given the tension between opportunity creation and knowledge appropria-
tion in commercial endeavors, how do network participants share enough knowl-
edge to co-create an opportunity, but not so much that they lose their private
appropriation? This situation requires firms to create the spoils before negotiating
how to share them, or in the words of an experienced executive who summed up
the issue: “How do you divide the bounty of the bear’s fur when you’ve only intuited
the bear’s possibility but haven’t sighted it yet?” The sighting requires broad effort,
while the leaders in participant firms have to do the “shooting.”
Revealing for Opportunity Creation
Selective revealing has emerged as a key collaboration strategy, not just in open
source collaborations, which popularized the topic,11 but also in the broader innova-
tion literature that addresses situations characterized by high levels of uncertainty.
Selective revealing involves sharing part of the firm’s knowledge or its intentions.
However, the predominant focus of such strategic revealing in the extant literature
is on commercial exploitation. We extend the concept to opportunity creation.
In extant literature, selective revealing assumes a network of potential com-
panies that respond to a focal firm’s preferences; it is thus positioned as “a strategic
mechanism to improve the firm’s technological and market conditions” by getting
others to cooperate on technology trajectories and product extensions.12 It is com-
monly understood to involve voluntary spill-overs by the focal firm.13 Conditions
calling for selective revealing include uncertainty about potential partners and a
presence of competitive threats. When firms are unable to identify the right part-
ners or define relevant knowledge, selective revealing is presented as a “clear signal
of the intent to collaborate” and establishes “a common ground for collaboration to
emerge.”14
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The process of selective revealing centers on problems and solutions. Problem
revealing focuses on “anticipated future technological problems for which [the focal
firm] seeks others’ support.”15 For example, research results might be revealed to
induce complementary investments. Meanwhile, solution revealing discloses a solu-
tion largely embedded in “a patent, publication, or product, or product compo-
nent.”16 This revelation might be undertaken to increase the downstream demand.
The goal of revealing may be either path extension—for example, inviting others
to enhance a particular product—or path creation—for example, by making an
open research call.
The current literature positions selective revealing for opportunity exploi-
tation. It assumes that the firm knows the technological path it wants to extend, the
product extensions to create, and the markets to pursue. This perspective applies to
both problem revealing and solution revealing. For example, in problem revealing,
where others are invited to address a specific problem (by spreading the issue), the
focal firm has (already) identified the particular issue as strategic. If the problem
revealing follows the strategy of agenda shaping, the firm guides discussions and
legitimate discourse toward the firm’s future preferences and encourages invest-
ments that are compatible with the technology path that the firm has already iden-
tified. In solution revealing, the product enhancement strategy extends the firm’s
technology trajectories by influencing downstream demand and complementary
solutions. Niche creating—a form of solution revealing—involves increasing the
attractiveness of the “preferred technology trajectory” by shaping institutional rules
or resources.17
However, from the perspective of opportunity creation, valuable opportuni-
ties might bemissed if knowledge integration is constrained by previously predeter-
mined and already committed problems and solutions. Therefore, heterogeneous
networks have an important role to play in supporting novel opportunity creation
beyond existing horizons.18 The very heterogeneity invites the harnessing of the
participant knowledge and exploration of its many recombinations. Rather than
simply revealing a predefined problem, a heterogeneous network may engage in
problem abstraction and its distancing. For example, what would be a global
expression of a local problem, such as water shortages? Rather than seeking agree-
ment or collusion on one solution, a heterogeneous network might solicit multiple
perspectives and technological approaches. For example, oil companies have
learned from the cement industry how to keep oil liquid in arctic conditions in case
of an oil spill.19 Or a forestry industry company collaborated with a professional
college to develop an environmentally friendly concept car.20 Because opportunity
creation may be oriented toward path creation that goes beyond the problems
and/or solutions conceived thus far, we propose a third revealing strategy—context
interacting—which is about shifting the conversation from a particular point in time
to the future, or from a particular business model to a broader set of novel compe-
tences, or from a specific industry focus to seemingly remote innovation arenas
where similar functional challenges exist. Table 1 summarizes selective revealing
strategies for opportunity exploitation and opportunity creation.
Revealing for opportunity creation poses novel challenges for knowledge
protection beyond mechanisms targeted at exploitation. Market power strategies,
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such as a dominant design, rely on problem definition by a leading firm and elimi-
nate joint opportunity creation. Strategies for knowledge modularization or infor-
mation trading of segmented knowledge along commercial or expertise domains
reduce costly conflicts in exploitation but simultaneously prevent unexpected and
serendipitous knowledge (re)combinations. The exercise of legal privileges (e.g.,
patents, trade secrets) narrows collaboration and again restricts combinatorial pos-
sibilities. Also, separating knowledge from its data source or revealing only partial
information requires collaborators to procure the remaining knowledge from other
sources.21 These practices delay collaboration and suppress serendipitous, integra-
tive opportunity creation. Some studies22 have acknowledged that in early R&D
collaborations, participants face a “paradox of disclosure,”wherein either too much
or too little sharing threatens to end the collaboration. Yet these studies do not pro-
vide remedies beyond limiting collaborations to trusted relationships.
There is a need to better understand strategic revealing in opportunity crea-
tion. In particular, practices in opportunity creation need to be identified that extend
beyond internal and bilateral R&D teams23 and beyond the interactions between
industrial and academic researchers.24 Although researcher interaction among cur-
rent and potential competitors is not a new problem, it has becomemore salient with
the increasing popularity of heterogeneous innovation networks.We next describe a
study of how heterogeneous network participants learned interactive revealing for
opportunity creation. Problems and opportunities were neither formulated by any
one firm prior to the engagement nor defined by focal firm broadcasting. Rather,
new contexts were jointly explored and improvised through novel and spontaneous
opportunity creation, and participants learned about problems and solutions through
trial and error. These interactive revealing practices emphasize both what is revealed
and how it is simultaneously protected. The process encompasses not only what to
reveal but importantly, how to reveal. In such interactions, participants co-opt some
of the strategic choice from their managers.25
Research Context
The hundreds of industrial participants we studied were participating in four
different innovation networks in Finland. The networks comprised varying industry
segments, including information and communication technology (ICT), forestry,
TABLE 1. Selective Revealing in Opportunity Exploitation and Opportunity Creation
Opportunity Exploitation* Opportunity Creation
Problem revealing: Issue spreading; Agenda shaping Problem interacting: Distancing and abstracting to open
up the problem definition
Solution revealing: Product enhancing; Niche creating Solution interacting: Addressing the issue from multiple
perspectives and knowledge bases
Context interacting: Exploring open-ended novel
business trajectories and future visions
*O. Alexy, G. George, and A.J. Salter, “Cui Bono? The Selective Revealing of Knowledge and Its Implications for Innovative
Activity,” Academy of Management Review, 38/2 (April 2013): 282.
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metal products, and energy. The networks were founded in 2007–2008. The
research programs in each network varied greatly in their very broad goals,
including doubling the value of the member companies in the next 25 years,
developing new business ecosystems, and developing globally competitive capa-
bilities in new markets, such as clean energy and digital services (see Appendix).
Global competition created a sense of urgency among the member companies as
they actively sought new growth opportunities. Each program was led by an
industry representative. The reasons for joining the networks were highly varied,
apart from competitive pressures, and ranged from curiosity to product develop-
ment motives, to eventual interest in exploring new knowledge domains and
ecosystems.
Each network managed 4 to 6 large research programs, with up to 60 partici-
pating organizations and up to 500 participants. Industrial organizations—including
both large and small companies—self-selected to join the network. University and
national research laboratories participated at the request of an industrial organiza-
tion. Funding, which reached into the hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars per con-
stellation over the first four years, came from the participating companies (50% or
more), with the balance provided by a public innovation agency.
We observed and interviewed participants in the research programs during
the first four years of the networks’ existence.We interviewed over 100 people, some
multiple times, with participants and project managers (see Appendix). For a bal-
anced view, we also interviewed managers, senior executives of the organizations,
and the network leaders. Additional data came from archival and public sources,
industry reports, Web material, and internal research documents, as well as partici-
pation in all-hands research meetings.26 We were able to study the research net-
works in real time as they formed and had broad access to various constituents.
For most firms and their participants, the networks represented a far broader
based collaboration than they were accustomed to and one for which they had no
proven practices. Not surprisingly, nearly half of the early programs ended prema-
turely or experienced the departure of key partners, thus suggesting some degree
of failure early on. However, the four networks all continue to function, even six
and seven years later. Recently, an external assessment by a group of appointed lead-
ers made recommendations that primarily addressed the administrative process.
Public funding has continued, and the networks compete for their funding. The pub-
lic funder has collected data at the aggregate level in terms of patents, publications,
and pilot studies, and based on this data, the continued public funding has been seen
as justified. The networks have continued to attract more companies that wanted to
participate than could be accommodated, and they have developed many across-
network research programs, thus further increasing their heterogeneity. One of
the networks has been reformed to increase the heterogeneity of its membership.
Generally, participants appreciate that the networks represent and provide a novel
way to collaborate across industry and academia for future innovation potential.
The networks have also made significant progress in connecting internationally.
In our research over multiple years, data collection and analysis were inter-
twined. We wrote narratives of each network with key events, concerns, and devel-
opments. Multiple rounds of coding were conducted around sharing and protecting
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that involved note-taking, memo-writing, and open coding, throughout which we
immersed ourselves in the data and began to examine the revealing practices. Using
an iterative process, wemapped the instances of practices to different categories, and
the categories that ultimately emerged are presented in this article.27 We also fol-
lowed an iterative process of visiting theory, data, and literature to refine our find-
ings, ground them in theories, and clarify our contributions.
More specifically, we followed the Gioia method28 of inductive sensemaking
based on grounded theory research. In the interviews, we sought to capture and then
interpret interviewee meanings and organize them in a “data structure” of progres-
sive abstraction that consisted of interview quotes, then the emergent themes—in
particular, protecting and revealing—and then their aggregate concepts.29 For exam-
ple, a phrase in an interview, “look at the problem as if from afar,” was linked to a
focal issue of sharing generic issues while protecting specific company core issues.
This phrase was then related to a higher abstract concept of “Interacting around
problems.”A quote that referred to “forcing people to work together to get meaning-
ful results in three months” helped us to delve deeper and discover how researchers,
while working closely and sharing results, frequently did not share methods. This
theme led to an aggregate concept of “Interacting around solutions.” The quote,
“no need to reveal what a company will (wish to) do with the results,” disassociated
the context of research from a firm’s future intentions. The quotes around this theme
were mapped to the aggregate concept of “Interacting around contexts.”We built on
a theoretical foundation of selective revealing and grounded the emergence of prac-
tices in a narrative.
The two authors took different roles in different phases of the analysis. The
first author conducted most of the early interviews; the second author participated
in later ones. The analysis was conducted independently by both and then inten-
sively discussed. To improve the validity of our findings, the results of the initial
analysis were shared with the key informants and were presented to a number
of audiences participating in the networks. One senior executive told us that the
results, or the selective revealing practices we identified, “capture explicitly what
has been happening,” although he “was not able to articulate them before.” The
final set of revealing practices was validated with six key network leaders.
The Networks in Formation
First, research contract negotiations stymied progress. Much bickering arose
over the pricing of research deliverables, over the transfer of the innovations to dif-
ferent parties, and particularly over who would have access to the results. A public
sharing rule was then instituted by the technology and innovation agency that man-
dated the following: a free user-right to all research results (i.e., foregroundmaterial)
for those participating in the research program, without any exceptions or consider-
ation of the amount of private investment; licensing of all knowledge brought in to
the project (i.e., background material) to all participants, either for free or for a rea-
sonable fee; and making the final results public. The rule was intended to eliminate
the time-consuming determination of the value of an innovation that did not exist
or could not yet be materially conceived. The rule also preempted prior collaboration
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modes that, by segmenting knowledge, reduced the potential for opportunity
creation. The industrial participants were unable, or at least less able, to use these
familiar modularization strategies, as well as bilateral contracts and exclusive
licensing and patenting arrangements.
This public sharing rule was contested by participating companies, causing
emotional backlash and interfering with the collaborationwhile frustrating the partic-
ipants who struggled with different research traditions and cultures. Some industrial
participants were told by their firms to limit their research interactions to already
familiar and trusted parties, undermining the premise and purpose of heterogeneous
network innovation. Even as the tension of value appropriation was dominating con-
versations, however, so, too, did the urgency to co-develop innovations and expand
the collective opportunity space. Many managers of the participants acknowledged
that a bigger overall pie had to be created and different kinds of expertise pooled:
“The required resources are so large that no single firm will be able to go alone,” nor
does a firm alone have “the aspiration levels necessary”; collaboration was about
“new market creation,” and ”new horizons” would be developed in the partner net-
work. One company executive reflected on the early challenges as follows:
“The company must change its internal way of operating to benefit from the collab-
oration. Not just think about product development in a narrow sense but about new
competitive arenas and breakthrough goals….We are trying to come to terms with
new phenomena, such as Cloud or Clean technologies, that require partnering with
others to sketch the big opportunity picture. We try to match research institute
competences with company needs and understand what is business-critical among
the new emerging themes….Important to success is a participant company that is
able to run with the emerging results—not just consultants innovating but indus-
trial companies implementing.”
Transitioning to Interactive Revealing
Participants joined with little awareness of how the networks would require
knowledge-sharing practices different from those to which they were accustomed in
internal or bilateral R&D teams. Some participants continued to rely on private con-
tracts and case-by-case settlements. For instance, one large company initially required
its participants to sign separate nondisclosure agreements (NDAs) with partners, thus
complicating knowledge sharing in the research programs. This requirement reduced
the research to bilateral collaboration, which not only was unacceptable to the public
funder, but also interfered with opportunity creation in heterogeneous networks.
Another incumbent company used an arm’s-length strategy and hired a small consul-
tancy company as its legally valid representative to represent the firm in various project
meetings and joint project actions. However, this one-man company representative
did not possess any of the client expertise and competences of value and interest to
others in the project. Other firms hid behind academic participants.
To move forward, the companies needed to find middle ground between
“sitting on the defensive” (not revealing anything) and “risking our core technologies
getting licensed for free” (revealing too much). Sitting on the fence took the partici-
pants out of the interaction and away from collaborative opportunities: “You learn
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that to benefit, you have to share.” However, participants were also cautioned by
their leaders and legal counsels to not give away the crown jewels. Soon there was
a realization that new practices had to be developed. These practices required a strat-
egy that did not simply rely on knowledge exclusion. The first step was to play a
“game of knowledge trading” in background information. One network leader
shared his observations in the programs he oversaw:
“Now we exchange background information in research program preparations. This
behavior is new. It’s like ‘we bring new information A and you bring new informa-
tion B, and then we evaluate which one is valuable,’ and so on.”
Knowledge trading did not necessarily move the related research from familiar
and safe terrains toward novel opportunity frontiers and was eventually rejected as a
modus operandi. Other participants practiced defensive strategies. One strategymeant
that particular knowledge had to be circulated through parties that were known to be
laggards in forwarding details. Another strategy involved writing reports in the local
language (Finnish), which limited diffusion in companies with international work-
forces. Some participants at times simply identified the background facts as available,
and anyone interested in seeing them had to make an explicit request to gain access
to the content. Then, in response, the content would be provided piecemeal, in differ-
ent releases or versions. Such delaying tactics tended to harm not only the joint colla-
boration but also the firm’s interests because other partners were likely to reciprocate
with similar actions, slowing down their contributions and adversely affecting the
overall progress. Not speaking out, or non-revealing, was also acknowledged as useful
by a leader:
“At the network level, we have a practice in place that if you do not want certain
information to be part of background or foreground, do not bring it up.”
Although some shirking and opportunism remained, most participants began
to realize that a new mindset was critical for realizing the potential for opportunity
co-creation. As one company’s legal counsel put it:
“I first thought that there are only two extremes—the closed innovationmode and the
open sourcemode. But now I realize that [our joint work] is about that gray stuff in the
middle. That middle is up to us to define and come up with the playbook.”
The participants eventually learned to practice revealing in a way more suited
to joint opportunity creation. The following sections explain the practices as revealed
by our research.
Problem Interacting While Protecting Context
The first set of practices focuses on interacting around problem areas while
protecting by abstracting and therefore obscuring the strategic context in which
the problem (or problem area) is critical for the company. As one executive noted:
“It is essential to differentiate between generic issues (to be openly discussed) and
those that belong to our core business (to be protected).”
For example, the discussion might focus on the improvements in user interfa-
ces but not on what design a particular company considers strategic for its customer
retention; or green energy systems offered a way to discuss too high CO2 emissions,
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but left hidden where the firm faced difficulty in meeting the environmental
standard. In this realm, academic participants were helpful in terms of separating
the general or common from the contextual and of serving as conduits for the dif-
fusion and travel of research ideas. The practice helped protect private interests
because the firms did not share the nature of their particular technology or busi-
ness handicap.
Another related strategy that allowed for revealing problems while protect-
ing context was distancing. One participant noted that sharing particular informa-
tion was a sensitive move, but when looked at from afar, “as if from outside,” its
meaning was relatively minor; hence, the sharing, which was critical for moving
forward at the time, became possible. Also, some participants achieved distance
by deliberately taking a very long temporal perspective. Such distancing helped
them to develop a reflective perspective, rather than focusing on the issues, and
even emotions, at hand. In some instances, we observed that distancing involved
stepping outside an in-company role for the sake of aligning multiple interests
and thus opening the door for in-the-moment compromises, as the needs indi-
cated. For example, one participant noted that the development of a new kind of
nanoparticle was important for a number of firms involved: One stainless steel firm
might apply the particle to increase the versatility of its steel, while an engineering
firm might support its solutions-oriented business. Thus, everyone benefitted, and
“that was ok.”
Humor was also used for distancing in the form of scripted plays—part of an
informal workshop that made fun of entrenched participant roles and hence opened
up possibilities for less guarded interactions. In a number of ideation sessions orga-
nized in one research program, a senior industry executive acted as a jester to poke
fun at the industry dogma. Such humorous distancing helped participants to estab-
lish a detached perspective to their businesses, allowing them to share knowledge
on sensitive or embarrassing issues (for example, about prior firm failures). Humor
helped to get over bottlenecks or tough situations, in cases where determining what
to share and what not to share seemed challenging to impossible, or where sharing
sensitive information had to happen to avoid unproductive directions or make any
progress at all. The speaker was allowed a stance where revealing more than usual
was permissible. In addition, through such practices, participants benefited from
the fresh perspectives that wit allowed, which helped them to change the framing
of an issue in terms of varying contexts, time horizons, or playfulness. Participants
were then able to be more nuanced (and perhaps less embarrassed) in revealing
problems areas.
Box 1. Practices for Problem Interacting While
Protecting the Company Context
Abstraction: Discussing research issues at a sufficiently high problem level,
with the support of academic participants, to mask any one company’s
strategy context. For example, discussing attractive user interfaces at the
continued on next page
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design level while not disclosing the company’s lack of customer retention;
or while protecting the company’s particular business model, sharing les-
sons learned regarding existing effective business models in a particular
technology area.
Distancing over Time: Assessing the likely competitive significance of particular
information over the long term. For example, “stepping outside the company
view” to see the communications, payment, and interface infrastructures
required for digital business—and to appreciate the eventual benefits for
the company, thus facilitating the company’s contribution (or sacrifice) to
building such an infrastructure.
Distancing with Playfulness: Scripting and acting out roles that showcase
behaviors that help reveal and protect skillfully. For example, acting out a
role-play where nothing is shared and one where far too much is revealed,
thus exposing industry dogma with humor.
Challenges certainly emerged in interacting around problems. Separating the
problem and the company context required a certain level of unfamiliarity. In some
collaborations where the parties had a long shared history, masking knowledge was
impossible because the strategic context was shared. In these cases, the network
lacked heterogeneity. The particular network later reformed, withmuch greater par-
ticipant diversity. If too many parties were involved in the collaboration, with some
leaving and others constantly entering, sharing was meaningless because knowledge
did not accumulate, and joint opportunity creation was not productive. Research
programs that were too fragmented experienced early termination.
Solutions Interacting While Protecting Intent
The second set of participant practices focused on interacting around solu-
tions while protecting company strategic intent. Thus, the joint activities focused
less on one firm’s seeking other firms that would follow its lead and more on align-
ing for joint exploration—and hence path creation—of possible future solutions.
Although focal firm signaling did take place—for example, cloud technologies were
a key future growth area for one participant, which sought to persuade other firms
to join in application development—more often, firms interacted to explore a solu-
tion path and keep the momentum going. In exploring future solutions (e.g., novel
ecosystems capable of providing seamless services), protecting firm strategic intent
was important because firms had to be able to differentiate their future offerings
and avoid losing bargaining power over competitive positioning and partnering.
This key aspect was emphasized by a network leader:
“We attempt to provide a generic work flow and tools for the development of
digital services and try to advance the collaboration between various parties in the
[network] context without requiring that the involved parties reveal their real strategic
intents.”
Solution interacting required the alignment of participant research activities.
Initially, one research program adapted parts of an agile software development
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methodology30 to coordinate research interactions that involved business model,
organizational model, and large-scale platform development. In this large research
program with over 400 participants, industrial and academic participants worked
together in short three-month sprints to accomplish tasks while committing to reg-
ular interaction. The practice established an expectation of regularity in joint work.
Smaller tasks lowered the threshold of engagement, while the results brought
participants together at regular intervals. Participant attention was allotted to the
completion of tasks rather than to the (strategic) significance of tasks themselves,
while the workingmethod enabled participants to get to know each other and prac-
tice carrying out research together.
The progress in such sprints was attributed to “forcing people towork together
to get meaningful results in three months, by clarifying and aligning goals while
making research more iterative,” according to one researcher. The regularity legiti-
mated a structure in which the participants could work and thus eased interactions
while suppressing discussion on the competitive significance of the emerging solu-
tions. An emergent prototype might be based on “a case study at the customer site,”
but the customer was not revealed (particularly the line of business of the customer).
Only the results related to the testing of the prototype were described. The underly-
ing methods to generate the results were not shared. The standard templates for a
poster-type of sharing provided legitimacy for not revealing sensitive aspects, such
as methods or company goals. After the research program demonstrated the success-
ful use of sprints, the practice was adopted by other research programs.
Box 2. Practices for Solutions Interacting While
Protecting Intent
Aligning activities over time: Breaking work into tasks to be reported at reg-
ular meeting points. For example, industry and academic researchers
engaging in sprints (short task sequences) to accomplish narrowly defined
tasks at a rapid tempo, meeting every two to three months to present
and discuss posters communicating recent results.
Focusing on process, not strategy: Protecting private interests while moving
research ahead on process grounds. For example, a number of companies,
including competitors, participating in cloud platform development using an
agile methodology.
Engaging in such coordinated, fast-paced activity was not without its
challenges, of course. Agile methodology, even when modified to fit the research
context, was a practice that conflicted with the logics both in industry and in
academia. Many participants from industry firms were not used to abiding by a
mandate to work jointly with other industry and academia partners. Working
alone or just with academic participants on a sprint was not permitted. The partic-
ipants were not accustomed to producing and disclosing something every three
months. Neither was academia used to three-month research cycles: “We cannot
make systematic and reliable research within three months.” Sprints also went
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against the logic that outcomes had to match plans. Only goals and outcomes were
specified in plans, rather than methods and teams, and this level of unstructured-
ness was uncomfortable to some: “I need to know whom I report to.” Nevertheless,
the sprints forced people to work together in temporal alignment along a particular
solution path while increasing research interaction substantially. Sprints helped to
make the potential solution path visible.
Context Interacting While Protecting Problems and/or Solutions
The third interactive revealing practice, interacting around contexts, is about
sharing an experimental platform or the general business case while not revealing
the specific problems or solutions of interest to the firm. Innovation sessions, pilots,
and testbeds in experimental contexts removed from the firm’s current business
were frequently used in combination as tests of research concepts for their business
viability.
Heterogeneity of firms was highly valuable in providing different knowl-
edge and competencies and allowing firms to play different roles. One participant
suggested that good pilots require know-how from different companies. Such
broader knowledge expanded the capacity to envision a new landscape. The joint
team would define the requirements for a broad concept test, such as environ-
mental monitoring; it would then set up separate field pilots that would fulfill
these requirements. Such field pilots might focus on natural monitoring sources
and remote sensing technologies. Simultaneously, some team members worked
on the basic research issues, developing an overall testing capacity and general
environmental efficiency assessment. Sharing results was meaningful because of
the jointly envisioned landscape of domains and trajectories for environmental
monitoring. There was no need to expose a preferred technological or commercial
path, business strategy-related motive, or solution embedded in a proprietary plat-
form. The practice required participants to reveal the results of a particular exper-
iment that added detail or expanded the emerging landscape, but it did not
require that they reveal the results’ technological or strategic significance to the
company. As one research leader expressed the matter:
“No need to reveal what a company will (wish to) do with the results. Thus, your
company strategy can remain protected.”
Revealing in experimental contexts offered a neutral ground on which to
engage, including in innovation labs, scenarios, and business cases. Sharing results
(even when they failed) was easier when participants were not situated in the cur-
rent or a near-term business setting. Representational forms, such as business or
user cases, provided grounds on which to discuss the value of accumulated knowl-
edge and to integrate the different pieces of knowledge into a more narrative or
meaningful picture. Such accumulation was possible even when in the nascent
landscape the technology or user roadmaps were still sketchy or deficient. These
representational forms allowed for “telescoping” to the future, leveraging hetero-
geneous knowledge in the networks.31 Thus, each company could reflect on its
competences against jointly revealed future prospects while protecting its technol-
ogy development. For example, an industrial equipment firm explored the oppor-
tunities of carbon fiber by watching other participant companies experiment in the
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emerging area without knowing their future intent nor the details of how their
results were generated.
Box 3. Practices for Context Interacting While
Protecting Problems and/or Solutions
Taking research into an experimental, external context: Sharing results in inno-
vation labs, testbeds, pilots, and experiments while detached from the firm’s
current and future strategy. For example, participation by a leading company
in a number of different monitoring pilots across research projects, providing
its measurement competence and combining it with non-incumbent com-
panies’ potentially novel ideas to address environmental monitoring. (The
company had initially refused to participate, thinking it was more advanced
than the other participants, but soon realized that the project had already
reached the state-of-the-art methods that the company had mastered.)
Developing neutral platforms: Developing joint platforms and tools outside firm
context. For example: FORGE Service Lab; idea generation workshops;
startup environments; hackathons; and discussing extraneous business cases.
Outside platforms played an important role. One such platform was the
FORGE Service Lab,32 which supports the development of digital services in private
and public sectors. FORGE was developed in one of the networks as a response to
an explicit need to identify and experiment on capabilities for designing and devel-
oping digital services. It also provides shared telecommunications infrastructure.
The university startup environments provided another neutral ground to engage
in idea work33 around emerging technologies and to discuss business cases, such
as in gaming and health and wellness. Still other platforms included rapid idea
generation workshops around various uses of wood, which developed hundreds
of ideas to expand into new customer segments, from industrial to consumer and
from paper to textiles. The one-day workshop became a sort of social platform
where teams competed on the number of ideas they could produce. The winning
team generated more than 600 ideas. Such platforms or events—including “hack-
athons,” which were joint development events over a weekend—allowed partici-
pants to assess future perspectives without revealing future commitments and to
keep firm competences and strategy private. Their generic nature promoted the
development of capabilities for fast action without disclosing the underlying meth-
ods or planned or intended development paths.
Even when a neutral context was sought, there were challenges in executing
the practice. Shared contexts built on some elements that contained private company
knowledge or assets. The fear emerged that a particular firm’s technology would be
licensed for free in the form of an experimental platform. This legal exposure was
a concern to the firm’s managers. The researchers soon learned to separate and in
part manipulate what was made accessible for use and what remained private by
using different terms. Rather than calling certain technology assets “background,”
which implied that the knowledge would be shared among network participants,
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the term “platform” was used to imply proprietary technology assets. Another chal-
lenge arose when firms used business cases as a smokescreen, presenting case details
as mere formalities rather than incorporating any real business thinking. Over time,
the programs developed many generic tools and practices, such as poster templates
and collaboration maps that allowed the firms to work together without revealing
private problem issues or solution methodologies.
Table 2 summarizes our discussion of interactive revealing in pursuit of
joint opportunity creation. In “Interacting around Problems,” the company con-
text is protected; in “Interacting around Solutions,” its strategic intent is protected;
and in “Interacting around Contexts,” the problem—the company’s technological
interest—and its preferred solution, such as a particular trajectory to be followed
in the development of an offering, can remain hidden while different landscapes
for the future are envisioned and jointly explored.
Note that the actual practices in each of the categories evolved based on
participant engagement. The particular practices we observed are merely illustra-
tive of the art of interactive revealing in joint opportunity creation. Additional ways
of sharing and protecting knowledge may have been so creative as to be almost
unobservable in their finesse.
Although the networks we studied were located in Finland, and partial public
funding was used to incentivize university/industry and cross-industry collaboration,
similar research environments are found in other countries.34 Many researchers
have underscored the need for frequent interaction yet acknowledged its tension
of co-creation and appropriation.35 Our study’s contribution is to advance practices
for coping with the tension.
The Contingency of Heterogeneity
The heterogeneity in the networks influenced interactive revealing. On the
one hand, too little heterogeneity stymied the revealing because all company con-
texts were essentially the same. One network experienced intense industry rivalry
because of too little heterogeneity. Revealing anything at all exposed the company’s
strategic intent. Nor was it possible to discuss problems or solutions at any level of
abstraction or distancing. Thus, the principle of protecting while revealing was not
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available, and the constellation eventually reformed to include more heterogeneity
in its membership.
On the other hand, too much heterogeneity deprived the participants of
any common ground for discussion, and any knowledge revealed was meaning-
less to others. Very little knowledge integration was accomplished. This exces-
sive heterogeneity happened on one occasion when many small companies
joined a network with a variety of interests. Moderate heterogeneity was most
conducive to joint opportunity creation. The diversity was enough to allow for
protection of revealed knowledge, yet it also evoked joint opportunity creation.
Three of the networks were able to move toward moderate heterogeneity (see
Table 3). Moderate heterogeneity appeared to facilitate conditions for finding
the “sweet spot” wherein participants were able to use the interactive revealing
practices.
At the participant level, heterogeneity is demanding. Creating something
new, beyond what any one firm can accomplish alone, requires a mentality that is
elastic enough to appreciate the value of larger, heterogeneous collaboration for long
enough to produce interesting research results that then, after they emerge, can be
moved inside the company for commercialization. As a network manager stated:
“The Achilles’ heel is that without joint value creation, there is no capture of value
either. Firms have to be able to assign a participant to a project who is able to con-
tribute but also to bring the value back home.”
Such participant capability requires an appreciation for a multitude of com-
petences and a pooling of expertise—as well as an ability to deal with occasionally
high levels of frustration, as our participants testified: One has to be comfortable
with the “fog of the future,” outcome ambiguity, and different time horizons, for
example. Participants also must be alert to serendipitous developments to identify
the potential they offer for innovation. Clearly, much is expected from the partici-
pants who are engaged in projects, despite their spending only limited time on any
one project. Without attentive participation, at times in what seemed like “endless
meetings and gatherings,” the participants lost out in the integration of results, par-
ticularly across different research programs. The researchers’ persistent participa-
tion, or their absence, in the program and its meetings affected the knowledge
combinations they could bring back to their firms for appropriation.
















Low Medium to High Medium High
Rivalry High Medium Low Low
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In a heterogeneous network, the interactive practices we have identified go
beyond the trading of knowledge and the “buddy” models of sharing knowledge
with trusted partners. Sharing knowledge with the trusted partners may indeed
be safe; however, it substantially limited exploration beyond adjacent issues. Because
of the large number of participants, the heterogeneity served more as a catalyst than
as a risk mitigation strategy, as illustrated in the literature:
In these kinds of collaborative endeavours, each partner is afraid that sharing ideas
might enable another partner to patent knowledge, which is of a competitive nature.
Each partner has its own ongoing business activities and each partner is concerned
about the possibility that another partner gets the opportunity to disturb these existing
business activities….[Therefore], we explicitly defined for each partner its own domain
of expertise. [The alliance manager]36
Even without the public sharing rule, the networks simply included too many
participants for any divide-and-own agreement. Pilot studies, or experimental research
prototypes, were acknowledged to require competences from many firms to accom-
plish something novel. Research in an area like nanotechnology was applied for steel
and for paper production. Importantly, the nature of heterogeneity that proved to be
valuable could not be judged ahead of the collaboration (thus complicating its use for
risk mitigation) but could only be understood afterwards when the opportunity
emerged. If the firms in our study had decided that nanotechnology research was
owned by the paper firm in a divide-and-own agreement, the steel company would
not have learned about the advances, nor could it have applied the results in its differ-
ent commercial domain because the results would have been patented by the paper
firm conducting the research. The outcome validates the call by the executive already
cited in our introduction to “divide the bear fur later.” In addition to its recombinatorial
purposes, heterogeneity was used for building experimental platforms where different
companies could choose to play different roles. One such outcome was the already
mentioned FORGE Service Lab, offering support infrastructure and tools for compa-
nies interested in developing digital services.
For the opportunity areas to emerge, firms had to provide different building
blocks. New opportunities required bringing together a number of different interfaces,
infrastructures, and transactional competences. Researchers of energy and environ-
mental sustainability came together for “clean” energy with vastly different value
and belief systems. Participants in research programs onhealth care and digital services
explored new landscapes around “speedy recovery.” In theseways, heterogeneitywas
harnessed for framing, exploring, and developing large opportunities, where novel
customer offerings and value claims could be made by multiple firms, some of which
competed with each other and some of which were supportive of, or complementary
to, each other, thus constituting a thematic ecosystem. In these emerging opportunity
areas, firms could participate while keeping their strategic intents hidden.
Implications for Network Leadership
These practices do not eliminate the need for the participating firms and
their leadership to make strategic choices. To the extent that firms decide to engage
in joint opportunity creation, rather than broadcast their technological position to
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the network “out there,”37 the interactive revealing practices gain urgency and
importance. While the managerial literature has previously discussed activities
such as distancing or pilots for different strategic goals, these activities have not
been considered as part of interactive revealing, although they generally are
acknowledged to be constitutive of opportunity creation. We found interactive
revealing naturally embedded in these exploratory elements.
Interactive revealing allows collaborations without pre-existing relationships.
Without the burden of the past (and possibly also of the future in terms of strategic
commitments), network heterogeneity can be used to fuel innovation. Interactive
practices then allow for the competing options to be explored, without their being lim-
ited to, or imprisoned by, judgments based on the leading knowledge and superior
appropriation capabilities of industry incumbents. Smaller participant companies
reported having doubled or tripled their earnings during the seven years of our study,
whereas larger incumbents pointed to learning strategy-critical information. During
the external assessment of the network conducted by an independent consulting com-
pany, many senior executives expressed satisfaction with the collaborativemodel. The
executives publicly suggested that the network represented a “novelway of collaborat-
ing for the future due to its heterogeneous constitution and researcher interaction.”
Some thought the network was a good way to rehearse such broad collaboration—a
critical capability for the future of their company’s competitiveness. One senior indus-
try executive described the value of the network as lifting the business’s aspirations:
“Where we have looked into the future more carefully and collaborated in new
kinds of ecosystems and value chains, we are already up and running and much
better at coping with opportunities as they emerge.”
The challenge for the leadership is to realize that interactive revealing sup-
ports a nuanced approach, in which knowledge that is constitutive of opportunity
creation can be revealed in a skillful form by abstraction or distancing, while the
knowledge that is crucial for value appropriation can be simultaneously protected.
Certain knowledge, including intent, can remain private, but the ways in which the
problems and solutions are represented likely differ when considered in light of cre-
ating opportunities vs. appropriating value. Hence, the practices suggest a differ-
ence between the pieces of knowledge that firms create an opportunity with and
the pieces they need to appropriate value from.38
Conclusion
While interactive revealing is no panacea, and is not presented here as a
singular innovation model, it nevertheless is fit for creating non-adjacent opportu-
nities that require integrating knowledge into new opportunity arenas. The
approach goes beyond seeking partners to solve existing technological issues or
developing commercial capacity for product-market exploitation. In this particular
application, heterogeneous networks and their diverse knowledge create more
expansive opportunities for researchers who can engage in network leadership
by abstracting knowledge, distancing the context, and working in alignment to
reveal and combine results into larger visions—all without leaking company
development intent and proprietary methods.
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Malcolm Gladwell tells an illuminating story, “The Bakeoff,”39 about a com-
petition to create the world’s most nutritious yet delicious cookie. The winner was
the team that excelled in knowledge integration: “The decisive edge had come not
from the collective wisdom of a large group but from one person’s ability to make a
lateral connection between two previously unconnected objects: a tortilla chip and
a cookie.” Interactive revealing practices can increase the integration of diverse
knowledge without relying on a single person’s genius, while reaching beyond
open sourcing or modularizing knowledge in a pre-packaged form. Who (else)
might have guessed—ahead of the bake-off—that tortilla chips would be the win-
ner when combined with cookies?
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